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Testimony of the Governor of the Banco de España to the Parliamentary Committee on 
Economic and Financial Affairs on the occasion of the presentation of the 2009 Annual 
Report
The presentation of the Banco de España Annual Report for 2009 —the reason behind 
my testimony today— has taken place at an exceptional time for both the Spanish econ-
omy and the Economic and Monetary Union. The economic and financial crisis spanning 
2008 and 2009, from which most European countries had started to emerge in recent 
months, has given way to a crisis in the euro area which was triggered by a specific epi-
sode, namely the Greek fiscal crisis, but whose systemic implications are proving most 
severe. In particular, the Spanish economy, along with that of other countries, has been 
seriously affected by these tensions and it is still too early to know whether the measures 
adopted in Europe to safeguard EMU and those currently under discussion will be capa-
ble of fully dispelling the doubts that have emerged in recent months over the soundness 
of this institutional framework. The responsibility of national authorities in this respect is 
also crucial.
In recent years the diagnosis by the Banco de España of the Spanish economy pointed to the 
presence of major imbalances, which had progressively built up in the long expansionary 
phase from the mid-1990s to 2007. These problems made it diffi cult to maintain a sustained 
growth rate in the medium and long term, and rendered our economy particularly sensitive to 
the adverse events that might occur. Accordingly, redressing these problems through reso-
lute economic policy action, especially in the area of structural reforms, was unavoidable. 
Notable among these imbalances was the excessive concentration of resources in the real 
estate sector and high private-sector debt, which were compounded by the persistence of 
serious structural defi ciencies in the functioning of the labour market. Under these condi-
tions, the 2008 and 2009 recession had a most virulent effect on Spain. This gave rise to a 
very intense fi scal policy response which, along with the other expansionary economic policy 
measures, helped soften the adverse effects of the crisis on activity. However, the budget 
defi cit rose to a very high level and did not prevent more severe job destruction than in other 
countries, despite the fact that the decline in output was on a similar scale. The excessive 
levels reached by both the budget defi cit and the unemployment rate opened up additional 
fronts of vulnerability in our economy, which was particularly affected by its high dependence 
on external borrowing, despite the enormous correction the external imbalance has under-
gone in the past two years.
Against this background, the Greek crisis has undoubtedly had a contagion effect, exposing 
the weaknesses of the European institutional arrangements and the potential implications for 
the more vulnerable countries, Spain among them owing to the above-mentioned reasons. 
Given the scale of the challenges facing us, it is vital that the economic policy response be 
suffi ciently ambitious and resolute, so as to speed the adjustment of the accumulated imbal-
ances and to lay the foundations for a more stable and fl exible economy. This would not only 
be to the benefi t of the Spanish economy; it is also essential for the very stability of the com-
mon European project.
On this economic policy response will hinge the strength of the recovery, which in Spain’s case 
has hitherto been very incipient and very reliant on temporary stimuli, that will tend to peter out 
in the short run. Even without the high degree of uncertainty surrounding us in recent weeks, 
the recovery would only be gradual and would take some time to attain a pace of expansion 
suffi cient to generate employment, which underscores the need to act decisively to avoid 
prolonged low growth.
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The Annual Report of the Banco de España addresses the current situation of and outlook for 
the Spanish economy in great detail. Accordingly, given the limited time for my testimony, I 
shall focus on three issues that are essential in my view in order to be able to exit the current 
situation and bring about a rapid return to sustained growth: fi scal consolidation; the steps 
that must be taken to set in place an effi cient labour market that rapidly promotes job creation; 
and, lastly, the restructuring of the fi nancial system, where substantial progress has been 
made in recent weeks.
Evidently, one fundamental challenge we face is the need to correct the strong deterioration of 
the budgetary position and ensure a rapid return to stability; otherwise, the expansionary mo-
mentum of public fi nances would become an obstacle to recovery. The challenge is an excep-
tional one since the budget defi cit stood at 11.2% of GDP in 2009, up more than 13 pp of GDP 
in only two years, and there was a substantial increase in the public debt/GDP ratio, which 
stood at 53.2% in 2009, a level nevertheless below the European average. This marked fi scal 
deterioration is partly due to the functioning of the automatic stabilisers, the discretionary 
measures adopted, the strong inertia of public spending and, above all, the decline in revenue 
linked to the end of the real estate boom, which will be diffi cult to turn around in the future. This 
means that much of the fi scal imbalance is structural, and it must be checked urgently with 
highly ambitious consolidation measures that manage to reverse the trend of spending and 
build revenue back up.
In other circumstances it would probably have been feasible to reduce the budget defi cit more 
gradually. But at present it is impossible to pursue such a strategy, in a setting in which inves-
tors are demanding a speedier return to a credible path of budgetary stability. Responding to 
this objective is the ambitious package of measures approved by the government on 22 May, 
complementing the initial consolidation efforts included in the State budget for 2010 and in the 
updated Stability Programme presented in January this year.
The authorities committed themselves in the updated Stability Programme to reducing the 
budget defi cit to 3% of GDP in 2013, in line with EU requirements under the Stability and 
Growth Pact. The package of measures approved in May involves bringing forward to 2010 
and 2011 a sizeable portion of the drive to reduce the defi cit. As a result, a defi cit target of 6% 
of GDP was set for 2011. This fi scal consolidation objective, entailing a reduction in the defi cit 
of more than 5 pp of GDP in only two years, is exceptional. But it is also vital so as to clearly 
bring public fi nances back onto a path of stability and dispel the risks perceived in connection 
with our fi scal position.
This budget defi cit target of 6% of GDP in 2011 should, moreover, be immovable and not 
conditional upon other factors, even though these are beyond the control of the authorities, 
such as lower-than-expected economic growth. The fi nancial markets’ perception of the 
likelihood of this objective being met will be a yardstick for the authorities’ degree of com-
mitment to pursuing an exit from this crisis, meaning this is the essential factor guiding 
decisions and budgetary conduct in the coming months. Accordingly, strict compliance 
with the target must be ensured, both through special budgetary monitoring and surveil-
lance procedures and through additional measures that should be applied if deviations 
from the target are detected. Naturally, to be in a position to react promptly and effectively, 
the measures most suited to the objectives set and which least interfere with a return to 
sustained growth must be designed in advance.
Given the high decentralisation of public spending in Spain, the regional and local govern-
ments’ participation in this austerity drive and their commitment to attaining budgetary targets 
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are vital. And I must say that the measures announced so far by most of these tiers of govern-
ment do little to respond to the radical reduction in unproductive public spending that our 
economy needs.
As I said earlier, the recently approved fi scal adjustment measures were urgent, since they 
were vital to curb a situation of extremely high instability that might have had disastrous con-
sequences. But there are other measures which, without having the same degree of urgency, 
are nonetheless more important, since their goal is to ensure medium- and long-term budget-
ary stability. Clearly, I am referring to the measures to reform our pension system. At an earlier 
date, the government tabled some proposals in the updated Stability Programme and, on this 
basis, the Toledo Pact Commission will set about work in the coming weeks. I do not wish to 
go into details here on the possible avenues of reform. But clearly, a combination of changes 
that were to raise the legal retirement age, the minimum number of years necessary to qualify 
for pension benefi ts and the period over which pensions are calculated would be optimal for 
ensuring the system’s viability.
Pension reform will not entail a signifi cant improvement in the budget defi cit fi gures in the very 
short term, but it will exert a powerful infl uence on the recovery of confi dence in Spain’s econ-
omy and in its public sector’s solvency, and that will translate into better fi nancing conditions 
and sounder growth prospects. Therefore, I can but urge that discussions under the aegis of 
the Toledo Pact take place as promptly as possible, with the widest political consensus, as I 
believe this may be a key factor for dispelling the uncertainty we have been facing in recent 
weeks.
The fi scal consolidation programme and the measures adopted to reinforce the institutional 
arrangements of the Monetary Union are fundamental, but they do not suffi ce to return the 
Spanish economy to a path of high growth, particularly following the strong adverse impact the 
recession has had on all the European countries’ potential growth capacity. Consequently, the 
other centrepiece of the response to the current emergency situation is to adopt a series of 
structural reforms conducive to the resumption of sustained growth in output and employ-
ment. These reforms, in turn, would contribute to progress in fi scal consolidation, as they 
would enhance the perception of the sustainability of public fi nances and would reduce the 
degree of sacrifi ce implicit in the necessary fi scal austerity that must be maintained in the com-
ing years.
There are several fi elds in which the Spanish economy requires an overhaul of its structures, 
to make them more consistent with our membership of a monetary area and with a highly 
competitive and globalised world economy. Two such fi elds are the labour market and the fi -
nancial system, on which I shall elaborate in detail later on in my address.
Correcting the ineffi ciencies weighing down on the functioning of our labour market is of para-
mount importance since, as the market is currently structured, the obstacles to gaining com-
petitiveness and generating sustainable employment are patently clear. In particular, these 
shortcomings have meant that the adjustment of the economy in the recent crisis has fallen 
disproportionately on employment as a result, among other reasons, of the scant sensitivity of 
collective bargaining to the specifi c situation of fi rms. The extent of these rigidities is not mere-
ly cyclical; their effects are largely permanent as they force fi rms and workers out of the mar-
ket, causing lasting damage to productive capacity and human capital.
Last week the government approved a series of measures aimed at correcting these ineffi -
ciencies, specifi cally at reducing duality in hiring and at reinforcing companies’ internal fl exi-
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bility. To do this, it opted to amend some of the features of the system currently in place, al-
beit without altering its most substantial aspects. In particular, the collective bargaining 
system has remained outside the bounds of the reform; this limits its scope and effective-
ness, since the interaction of bargaining with the labour hiring system is a key determinant of 
the labour market’s adjustability.
Notwithstanding, the reform promises headway in terms of internal and wage fl exibility that 
requires proper assessment, since it broadens the scope for fi rms in diffi culty to negotiate 
wage conditions with their workers that are better suited to the actual situation and to help 
save jobs. As I have indicated on numerous occasions, had this possibility actually been 
available during the recent crisis, the labour market adjustment would not have fallen so se-
verely on employment.
In parallel, in order to reduce the duality in hiring, certain measures have been adopted to in-
crease the incentives for permanent hiring. These involve extending the possibilities of using 
stable employment-promoting contracts and the elimination of some of the causes that en-
couraged an unwarranted use of dismissals for reasons other than economic ones. The cate-
gories of workers that may avail themselves of permanent employment-promoting contracts 
have also been widened, and certain restrictions on temporary hiring have been introduced. 
The passage of the reform through Parliament should be used to add greater clarity to the 
wording of the permanent employment-promoting measures so as to rule out restrictive inter-
pretations and boost its implementation. But the most debatable issue is the imposition of new 
restrictions on temporary hires, especially if permanent hiring does not improve suffi ciently. In 
the current conditions, with more than 4.5 million Spaniards unemployed, all job creation op-
portunities must be kept open and not in the least impaired until the new channels for perma-
nent hiring prove effective.
In short, the fi scal consolidation programme, the pension reform proposals and the labour 
market reform measures are three areas in which signifi cant advances have been made by the 
authorities in the last few weeks, but in which much work remains to be done. Let me now 
move on to the area of reform which falls directly under the responsibility of the Banco de 
España, namely the restructuring of the fi nancial system and, more specifi cally, of the savings 
bank sector, where there has been appreciable progress in recent weeks.
In the last few months a very signifi cant portion of Spanish savings banks has concluded 
merger agreements with other savings banks, in what is the largest restructuring of the Spanish 
banking sector in a long time. These movements started with the creation of the FROB (the 
Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector) in June 2009, nearly two years into 
the international banking crisis affecting the markets and fi nancial systems of all developed 
countries, and to which Spanish fi nancial institutions were exhibiting a marked resilience that 
most have maintained to date.
This new Fund responded to the need to downsize the Spanish banking sector, particularly the 
savings bank segment. After a prolonged period of growth, this segment had reached a size 
which, given the evolving demand for banking services, entailed a clear excess of capacity.
From an individual standpoint, the prolongation of the crisis affected the capacity of institutions 
to generate profi ts for the following reasons: an increase in non-earning assets (doubtful loans 
and repossessed real estate assets), the narrowing of margins due to a fall in income associ-
ated with rising non-earning assets and to a higher cost of funds, the decrease in business 
volume, etc.
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Moreover, the high growth of previous years, due particularly to increased business with the 
real estate sector, had raised the dependence on wholesale debt markets, exposing savings 
banks to the liquidity risk associated with adverse developments in those markets. Com-
pounding this is the intrinsic limitation of savings banks when it comes to raising core capital, 
a limitation which is important because the trend in both the markets and the prudential fi -
nancial regulation currently under international revision is clearly towards stepping up require-
ments in this area.
Given the need to downsize this sector and the conviction that the productive structure 
of many banks had to be rationalised to hold efficiency at adequate levels in a sector 
characterised by growing competition, the time was ripe for the creation of the FROB, 
under whose auspices many savings banks have arranged their mergers or institutional 
protection systems (hereafter referred to by the Spanish acronym “SIP”). These two forms 
of action are equivalent insofar as their main effects are concerned, because in SIPs 
(which are agreements containing clauses to ensure stability) the capacity to define key 
strategies and policies is transferred to a central entity and the participating banks large-
ly share their net assets and their liquidity, as well as pooling a high proportion of their 
profits.
The FROB has a second mandate: to participate in the restructuring of unviable banks, act-
ing in this case secondarily to the traditional deposit guarantee funds (DGFs). This dual na-
ture of the FROB and the consequent possibility that a distressed bank not involved in a 
merger or SIP process may undergo a crisis requiring the Fund to intervene (replacing direc-
tors and selling the bank or transferring its business to a third party) are an implicit incentive 
for banks to seek partners with which to conclude merger or SIP agreements.
The FROB has €9 billion in capital and €3 billion of funds from a debt issue and, if needed, it 
could raise up to €90 billion of funds from third parties.
Since the FROB was set up, a period of 12 months has practically elapsed. The end of this 
period is marked by the deadline of 30 June 2010 set by the European Commission notifi ca-
tion of 28 January 2010 on how to apply the general framework envisaged in it. This time 
limit applies only to the FROB’s competence to assist merger/SIP processes, not to proc-
esses of individual restructuring. At the present date, 38 of the 45 Spanish savings banks (39 
including Cajasur, a bank awaiting a solution within the framework of the FROB) are involved 
in merger/SIP processes affecting 92% of savings bank assets.
Of the 12 merger/SIP processes, seven are planned with FROB aid estimated at a total of 
about €10 billion, and the other fi ve without government assistance. Also participating in one 
of these processes is Caja Castilla-La Mancha, a bank seized by the Banco de España which 
received total aid of €3.8 billion from the deposit guarantee fund (DGF). The merger/SIP plans 
of these 12 processes have already been authorised by the Banco de España or are at the 
authorisation stage, except in one case in which three banks are participating in a project still 
under negotiation but which will not require FROB aid.
The operations involving merger/SIP plans with FROB aid envisage cuts of 20–25% in the 
number of offi ces and of around 15% in staff, which gives an idea of the scale of the meas-
ures proposed to improve bank effi ciency. The bank structure rationalisation measures are an 
indispensable requirement for receiving FROB aid and are being included naturally in the 
other planned voluntary operations, since these measures are responsive to the need to 
achieve more soundness, more effi ciency and more economic rationality.
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In addition to these savings bank merger/SIP operations, it should be mentioned that in the 
three years of international fi nancial crisis, only two savings banks saw their solvency deterio-
rate to such an extent as to require the application of precautionary special measures.
First, the directors of Caja Castilla-La Mancha were replaced by the Banco de España in 
March 2009 (before the FROB was set up). It received aid from the DGF totalling €3.8 billion, 
of which €1.3 billion consisted of preference shares and €2.5 billion were in the form of guar-
antees of asset value, as well as €350 million of bridge fi nancing. This savings bank, following 
the agreements reached by it with Cajastur, has joined one of the 12 merger/SIP processes 
under way.
Second, CajaSur was subjected to compulsory restructuring due to lack of solvency and via-
bility, following its failure to approve a merger with Unicaja, a sound and solvent project in 
which the two savings banks had agreed on a private solution for the failed institution. The 
FROB granted temporary aid through the subscription of €800 million of non-voting equity 
units and €1.5 billion in liquidity support, which so far it has not been necessary to use. De-
fi nitive arrangements are being worked out for this savings bank through a competitive proc-
ess in which the aid fi nally granted will be defi ned.
At present, the provisional amount of the aid to be received by Spanish savings banks in this 
process is as follows. The FROB will furnish around €10 billion to strengthen own funds in 
merger/SIP processes. This amount has to be repaid within fi ve years (extendable to seven 
years) and earns the market rate of interest (at least 7.75%). The fi gure is not fi nal because four 
processes have yet to be authorised. In addition, Cajasur will receive the aid fi nally resulting 
from the competitive procedure. 
Furthermore, the savings bank DGF, which is fi nanced by contributions from savings banks, 
undertook to provide €3.8 billion to Caja Castilla-La Mancha.
These amounts, while substantial, are small compared with those provided by the taxpayers 
of other countries. Therefore, it is fi tting at this point to recall that Spain is now enjoying the 
benefi t of the decision in 1999 to oblige banks to record a general provision: since January 
2008 our banks have used some €18.2 billion of this provision to cushion the impact of the 
crisis on their income statements. As can be seen, this amount is more than the sum of the 
funds used or to be used by the FROB and the savings bank DGF in the operations described 
above.
Thus the main decisions have already been taken on the required restructuring and downsiz-
ing of the savings bank sector. One task remains in connection with these banks: a legal re-
form to enable them to issue instruments eligible as top-quality own funds and to provide 
formulas conducive to improved governance and professionalisation of savings bank man-
agement.
The Banco de España’s confi dence in the soundness and competitiveness of the Spanish 
banking sector is based on the extensive information we have on the situation of each bank, 
obtained in the exercise of a supervisory function based on in-depth scrutiny and closeness to 
the supervised party. We also have the results of regular stress tests of the capacity of banks 
to cope with possible negative changes in the economic conditions in which they operate. At 
this moment, as the markets and some sectors of international public opinion are expressing 
distrust and reservations about the situation of several European fi nancial systems, and par-
ticularly Spanish savings banks, the Banco de España has announced its decision to publish 
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the results of stress tests in order to ensure the highest possible transparency of the situation 
of Spanish banks. Since agreement has been reached in Europe to conduct and publish com-
mon stress tests, the Banco de España will join this initiative and, therefore, publish the results 
of the stress tests on Spanish banks as soon as this common framework allows.
The restructuring and reform of the fi nancial system, together with the budgetary adjustment 
and the pension and labour market reform, are the most urgent measures needed to restore 
confi dence in the Spanish economy. They should therefore be implemented immediately. But 
the agenda of reforms required by our economy to move back to steady growth of economic 
and social well-being and continue modernisation does not end there. There are still important 
tasks which have to be tackled in unison by all Spanish political, economic and social actors. 
And, having said that, I cannot conclude without underlining the Banco de España’s fi rm com-
mitment to contribute accordingly.
22.6.2010
